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UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE ISSUE
Multidisciplinary
Practice After In re Enron
Should the Debate on MDP Change at All?
By Nancy B. Rapoport
© 2002. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
O n Dec. 2, 2001, Enron Corp.
filed a voluntary chapter 11
petition in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York. That petition com-
menced the largest chapter 11 case in
U.S. history,' and the story of Enron's
meteoric rise in the business world (and
its precipitous fall from grace in late
2001) has continued to capture the
public's attention.2
Naturally, everyone interprets the
case in light of his own experiences:
accountants focus on the accounting
laws; lawyers focus on the duties of
lawyers in representing their clients;
and lawmakers focus on possible leg-
islative solutions to prevent future occur-
rences.' The Report of Investigation by
the Special Investigative Committee of
the Board of Directors of Enron Corp.,
filed with the Bankruptcy Court on Feb.
2, 2002, points fingers at the company,
at some of the employees, at the compa-
ny's accountants, and at the company's
lawyers in an effort to determine what
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caused its business troubles. 4 We don't
have all of the facts - or any of the
answers - yet, and we may not have any
answers for a very long time. But the
Enron case, even as it stands now, gives
us an opportunity to consider whether
the current system of inside counsel,
outside counsel, separate accountants,
auditors, and other professionals, and
the like, serves the client better or worse
than would a more integrated, multidis-
ciplinary practice (MDP) setting.
In this essay, I won't belabor the
points made by both sides of the MDP
debate. The issue of whether state bars
should change their rules to permit
MDP inevitably raises the passions
(and blood pressure levels) of both
lawyers and academics.' I simply want
to point out that the current structure
of several-stops-shopping has some of
the same built-in drawbacks as does
MDP's one-stop-shopping.
I've weighed in on this issue before,
and I won't rehash my claim that legal
education fosters a type of thinking in
silos - an assumption that one substan-
tive area never overlaps with another.
But let's think about MDP structure for
a bit. The idea of MDP is that a client
can seek the advice of professionals
trained in several different disciplines,
all of whom are practicing together in a
single business.
Why might a client want one-stop-
shopping for professional services?
Clients have come up with several
different reasons. For example, clients
tend to prefer educating their profes-
sionals (lawyers, accountants, etc.)8 about
particular problems only once, rather
than several times (once per category of
professional). Moreover, clients hope
that, by combining the different disci-
plines, their lawyers will notice things
that their accountants might not; that
their accountants might suggest things
that their lawyers might not have con-
sidered; and that, ultimately, they'll get
the best advice possible from a synergy
of professional opinions. Finally, I'm
sure that clients hope that the fees from
a one-stop shop would reflect some
economies of scale that come from shared
overhead, eliminated redundancy, and a
shorter learning curve.
Why might lawyers resist MDP? The
literature abounds with arguments rang-
ing from the fear of losing their profes-
sional independence to the fear of
becoming irrelevant to clients.9 My own
take on the independence argument is
that our own ethics rules give us protec-
tion from any overbearing, evil-hearted
nonlawyers.i
What worries lawyers (or what should
worry them) isn't so much the lack of
an applicable ethics rule as it is the
powerful force of economics. It's hard to
say "no" to a client; it's especially hard
to say "no" to a client who comprises a
significant portion of your business. And
when the lawyers and accountants know
that there are ways to craft advice in
order to make that advice technically
legal, then it's even harder to sort out
the circumstances under which giving
that technically legal advice is not the
same thing as giving the client complete
advice. We are charged with represent-
ing our clients to the utmost of our abil-
ities. And our ethics rules permit us to
give complete advice - advice that takes
into account longer-term issues and issues
of morality and non-economic interests.l
My take on the argument that MDP
will make us irrelevant is that the argu-
ment is eerily reminiscent of the argument
of a slide-rule manufacturer who worries
about the development of the personal
calculator. If the manufacturer doesn't
offer what the market wants, slide rules
will become irrelevant; if the manufactur-
er adapts to reflect market demand, then
slide rules (or their progeny) won't
become irrelevant. Thus, if lawyers aren't
offering clients something distinctive
about their type of advice, then they, too,
risk becoming extinct as a profession.
The fear of irrelevancy is, at its heart,
the fear of not being able to demonstrate
the quintessential value of the discipline
of law" and the giving of legal advice.
As we lawyers talk to each other
about MDP, and about the sacrosanct
nature of lawyer independence, I'm sure
that accountants are talking with each
other about the sacrosanct nature of
their professional advice as well. " I
hear good lawyers talk constantly about
how frustrated they feel about the dete-
riorating nature of practice and about
how important character and moral
issues still are (and should be) to the
practicing bar. My guess is that good
accountants are having those same dis-
cussions with their colleagues.
To me, the real issue is how profes-
sionals deliver the best and most com-
plete advice to their clients. Lawyers and
accountants will both face the same prob-
lems, including being the bearers of bad
news ("no, you can't do that") from time
to time. All professionals should be ask-
ing themselves whether they want their
clients to choose short-term goals over
long-term ones; whether they want their
clients to choose financial considerations
over other types of considerations; or
whether they want their clients to listen
to a broader view of the issues raised
by their clients' specific questions. The
question of whether we should permit
MDP is, in the end, the wrong question.
The real issue isn't as much the struc-
ture of the firm(s) that are giving advice
but the nature of the advice itself.
My point is that good, fair, and com-
plete advice doesn't have to be a compe-
tition between accountants and lawyers.
If lawyers are doing their jobs, they are
giving the best possible, well-rounded
advice to their clients. And if accountants
are doing their jobs, they're giving the
same type of advice, accountant-style, to
the clients. 14 We have been focusing on
MDP as a problem in itself, instead of
recognizing the issue of MDP as a symp-
tom of a problem in the current practice
of our profession. Once we cut to the
chase, we can begin to address the fun-
damental problem: what kind of advice
should we be giving our clients, period?
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